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ExperimentsSocial preferences and social inﬂuence effects (‘‘peer effects’’) are well documented, but lit-
tle is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences
matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment
with independent payoffs between two agents we ﬁnd causal evidence for peer effects.
Efforts are positively correlated but with a kink: agents follow a low-performing but not
a high-performing peer. This contradicts major theories of social preferences which predict
that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related
efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and social
esteem are candidate explanations.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Is pro-social voluntary cooperation subject to ‘peer effects’, that is, inﬂuenced by the behavior of comparison others
(‘peers’)? Or is pro-sociality a preference that is largely immune to social inﬂuence? These questions are at the heart of this, United
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vacuum but are constantly exposed to peers. The purpose of this paper is to understand how social preferences and peer
effects are linked both by providing novel experimental evidence and by clarifying what theories of social preferences have
to say on peer effects.
We speak of a peer effect if an agent is inﬂuenced in his or her actions by what a comparison agent does, even if there are
no material spillovers between agents and hence no direct social preference links exist between peers (indirect links are pos-
sible, as our theoretical analysis will show). Our deﬁnition is narrower than frequent usage of the term in the literature.
Sometimes ‘peer effects’ is used as an umbrella term to describe behaviors where an agent reacts to other agents’ actions;
such a behavioral reaction might be motivated by social preferences. As an example, think of voluntary contributions to a
public good, where people contribute more the more other group members contribute. Such ‘conditional cooperation’ can
be due to peer effects, but also social preferences.
Understanding the link between social preferences and peer effects is important for two reasons. First, in reality social
preferences are often relevant in environments that are potentially rich in possibilities for social inﬂuence effects. Think
of the workplace as a prime example. In a seminal ﬁeld experiment, Falk and Ichino (2006) show that work effort is subject
to peer effects which were suggested to be important in non-experimental empirical work (Ichino & Maggi, 2000). Yet, their
study does not allow linking such peer effects to theories of social preferences, which is our main contribution.
Second, suppose we ﬁnd evidence for peer effects. What would the implication be for theories of social preferences? For
example, in popular theories of inequality aversion people’s social preferences are modeled as individually ﬁxed distastes for
inequitable outcomes. Evidence for peer effects would constitute a prima facie challenge to ﬁxed preference assumptions. We
deem it important to clarify theoretically whether peer effects indeed provide such a challenge or whether existing theories
assuming ﬁxed preferences can explain the data before resorting to changes in social preference parameters as an
explanation.
Our tool to measure peer effects is a one-shot three-person gift-exchange game where a principal pays his two agents i
and j a wage w (the same for both) and the agents choose efforts ei and ej. The material incentive structure gives both agents
an incentive to choose minimal effort irrespective of w and irrespective of the other agent’s effort. However, from numerous
two-person gift-exchange games we expect that many agents choose efforts that increase in wage. In this situation we will
speak of a ‘peer effect’ if ei = f(ej)|w, that is, holding the common wage w constant, agent i’s effort depends on agent j’s effort
(f0 – 0), despite the absence of any earnings interdependency between agents.
A major problem of measuring peer effects empirically is the ‘‘reﬂection problem’’ (e.g., Manski, 2000): ei = f(ej)|w and
ej = f(ei)|w. If i is inﬂuenced by j and j is inﬂuenced by i it is impossible to disentangle the causal inﬂuences i and j have on each
other. Herewe propose a novel design that avoids the reﬂection problem. Themain innovation is tomake the effort of the other
agent exogenous. To achieve this, both agents ﬁrst choose their efforts simultaneously and then, after having learned the effort
decision of their co-agent, are given the opportunity to revise their effort, holding their co-agent’s effort constant. Since the design
removes anymaterial and strategic incentives to revise effort, revisiondecisions (compared to a control conditionwithno effort
information) tell us about the extent to which people change their effort because of the effort chosen by the co-agent.
Our results provide unambiguous evidence for peer effects. Effort revisions are more likely and bigger when agents are
informed about their co-agent’s effort than when they are uninformed. When the co-agent has provided lower effort than
them they revise their efforts downwards, but they barely increase their effort when the co-agent provided higher effort.
To see whether these peer effects are a novel phenomenon that is incompatible with existing theories of social prefer-
ences, we analyze the theoretical predictions of widely used theories of social preferences that model various distributional
and/or intentional concerns under the assumption that preferences are ﬁxed. We focus on the best-reply predictions with
regard to effort changes, that is, dei/dej. To our knowledge, no such analysis has been done in the context of explaining peer
effects in voluntary cooperation.
The most robust predictions of these standard theories of social preferences are that either there are no peer effects
(efforts are unrelated in models of reciprocity), or if there are peer effects, efforts are negatively related (in all other models).
Our ﬁnding of peer effects with positively correlated efforts seems therefore inconsistent with most models. However, this
evidence is not fully conclusive because predictions are about the agents’ best-reply functions, which our simple revision
decisions do not reveal.
To have a conclusive test we ran experiments where we also elicited the agents’ beliefs about the initial effort choice of
their co-agent. Thus, we now observe two points on each agent’s best-response which allows us to draw conclusions about
the slope of the best replies. The results reject the prediction of most theories that efforts are negatively related. In the peer
effect we observe, efforts are strategic complements, not substitutes. Also the theories that predict positively correlated
efforts are only consistent with a minority of choices.
While standard theories of social preferences which model equality concerns and/or intentions, typically predict the
opposite of what we ﬁnd, recent theories that incorporate social motives like conformism (Sliwka, 2007), norm-following
(López-Pérez, 2008), or social esteem (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008) can explain the peer effects we observe.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places our paper in the related literature. Section 3 introduces our experi-
mental game and procedures. Section 4 presents our results on peer effects. Section 5 discusses the implications of various
models of social preferences in our game. In Section 6 we analyze data on agents’ beliefs to identify the slopes of the reaction
function which allows us to contrast data and theories. Section 7 discusses the signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings and alternative
theoretical explanations. Section 8 summarizes the paper.
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Hitherto the literature[s] on social inﬂuence effects and social preferences are, with a few exceptions, largely unconnected.
The literature on social preferences shows that many people are willing to act against their self-interest even in anonymous
one-shot situations with incentives to behave selﬁshly and no possibilities for social inﬂuence (e.g., Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, &
Fehr, 2005). The literatures on social inﬂuence effects show that people’s behavior in many economically important domains
is often strongly shaped by what comparison others do even in the absence of material payoff spillovers.1 Similarly, social psy-
chologists have long argued that situational cues (provided by the environment or the behavior of others) are often more impor-
tant than personality traits (Asch, 1952; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Both social preferences and social inﬂuence effects are ﬁrmly
established empirically, but little is known about how social preferences are inﬂuenced by, and related to, peer effects.
In connecting these literatures, our paper makes two main and intertwined contributions. Our ﬁrst contribution is to pro-
vide novel and causal evidence for peer effects in reciprocity by using the gift-exchange game run in the direct response
method and by ruling out confounding factors such as strategic incentives that might be present, for instance, in repeated
interactions (as in Falk, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2013, who used ﬁnitely repeated simultaneous public goods games to study
peer effects in voluntary cooperation). The use of the direct-response method is one distinguishing feature of this paper rela-
tive to Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton (2012) and Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton (2013) who also use a three-person gift-ex-
change game but play it in the strategy method. Both studies ﬁnd evidence for peer effects which take the form of
positively correlated efforts, but by their strategy-method designs are unable to observe the kink in efforts we are able to
observe in our design. Moreover, both papers also allow for wage inequality, which our design precludes for simplicity.
Our use of the gift-exchange game separates our study from papers that investigate and ﬁnd peer effects (in the absence
of any payoff spillovers like in our case) in sharing in the dictator game (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Cason & Mui, 1998; Krupka &
Weber, 2009) and in the ultimatum game (Ho & Su, 2009). Papers more closely related to the experimental part of our paper
are Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) and Mittone and Ploner (2011). Bardsley and Sausgruber provide evidence that con-
tributions to a one-shot public good can be shaped by observing the contributions of an unrelated other group. Mittone
and Ploner also study a sequential game of reciprocity, in their case the trust game, and unlike us, they use the strategy
method. Their central tool is an observer/observed design with the difference to our study being that the relevant group
of recipients is comprised of groups of four, two of whom are observed and two who are the observers. The return rates
(‘trustworthiness’) of the observed and observer recipients are positively correlated, which is evidence for peer effects in
reciprocity. In our design, everyone is an observer and is observed, while strategic incentives to inﬂuence others are absent.
Our second contribution is to clarify the power of a range of theories of social preferences for explaining peer effects in
reciprocity. We provide a formal analysis and then run further experiments to compare the best-reply predictions with the
empirically estimated slope. Such an analysis is methodologically important to safeguard against premature declarations of
peer effects as a phenomenon that requires separate explanations from those of existing theories.
We deem it important not to pre-select one particular theory (most typically, the Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 model) but to look
at a whole range of theories, which capture different psychological motivations. Such an analysis can narrow the range of
theories that are candidate explanations for peer effects, even if we acknowledge that one lesson of tests of theories of social
preferences is that all fail in some dimensions (e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002; Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad, 2007; Daruvala 2010;
Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008) and maybe especially so in three-person games (e.g., Kagel &
Wolfe, 2001). A comprehensive comparative analysis can provide insights about patterns of failures across classes of theories
that are informative in their own right.
3. Design and procedures
3.1. A design to avoid the reﬂection problem: the three-person gift-exchange game with a revision stage
Our three-person gift-exchange game is an extension of the two-player gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl,
1993) – there is one principal and two identical agents. The principal ﬁrst chooses the same wage w e {50, 100, 200} for both
agents. After observing w, the two agents decide simultaneously about their effort, that is, they choose ei e {1, 2, . . ., 20}.
Our central tool to avoid the reﬂection problem is the introduction of a ‘‘revision stage’’. Agents learn about the revision
stage where they are informed about the ‘initial effort’ decision of their co-agent, ej.2 In light of this new information agents1 Some examples comprise deviant behavior (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002), academic success (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001), savings behavior (e.g.,
Duﬂo & Saez, 2002); corruption (e.g., Dong, Dulleck, & Torgler, 2012); tax evasion (e.g., Prinz, Muehlbacher, & Kirchler, 2014); health-related issues like alcohol
consumption (Kremer & Levy, 2008) and obesity (Christakis & Fowler, 2007) and behavior in the workplace (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2010; Ichino & Maggi,
2000; Mas & Moretti, 2009). A few studies have investigated ﬁeld settings where observed results are consistent with peer effects, but also social preferences,
such as conditional cooperation in naturally occurring public goods (Chen, Harper, Konstan, & Li, 2010; Frey & Meier, 2004); and charitable donations (Croson &
Shang, 2008; Shang & Croson, 2009).
2 When agents decide on their initial effort they do not yet know about the possibility to revise effort and about the fact that their effort choice would be
communicated to the other agent. This is necessary to avoid that the initial effort is strategically biased, which would preclude a clean measurement of peer
effects. The information about the revision possibility and its description appeared on a separate screen (see Appendix A). The reader may ask why this
procedure rather than letting the agents choose their efforts sequentially. We could then test whether the second mover’s effort depends on the effort of the
ﬁrst moving agent. However, it is difﬁcult to disentangle peer effects from the second-moving agent’s disposition to reciprocate toward the principal. The ﬁrst
mover might have set his or her effort strategically, to inﬂuence the second mover’s effort. Our design avoids these problems.
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e^i 2 f1;2; . . . ;20g. To make the revision decision incentive compatible, agents are told that only for one randomly selected agent
the revised effort is relevant for calculating earnings, while for the other agent the initial effort remains relevant for the payoffs. A
random device generates r 2 {0, 1} with equal probability. In case r = 1 agent 1’s revised effort and agent 2’s initial effort are
payoff relevant (that is, agent 2’s revised effort has no effect on any of the earnings). In case of r = 0, agent 2’s revised effort
and agent 1’s initial effort are payoff relevant (and agent 1’s revised effort has no effect on any of the earnings). Thus, our design
ensures that (1) only one agent’s revised effort matters, and therefore the other agent’s initial effort is unaltered, and (2) it
allows us collecting data from both agents. Subjects know this procedure (but not yet the outcome of the random draw) when
choosing the revised effort. The expected earnings of the principal are3 ToxP ¼ vEr ½rðe^1 þ e2Þ þ ð1 rÞðe1 þ e^2Þ  2w; ð1Þ
where v > 0 is the constant marginal product of the agents’ efforts. The expected earnings of the two agents are calculated asx1 ¼ w Er ½rcðe^1Þ  ð1 rÞcðe1Þ and x2 ¼ w Er½ð1 rÞcðe^2Þ  rcðe2Þ; ð2Þ
where the cost of effort is equal to c(ei) = 7(ei  1) for both agents.3 Note that we impose uniform wages and identical marginal
productivity (v), because we want to observe the two agents in an identical situation.
The revised effort is our main instrument to identify social interaction effects. The only change between the initial effort
decision and the revision stage is the additional information about the co-agent’s effort. We use Dei ¼ e^i  ei as a measure for
the reaction to effort information, that is, as an indication for a peer effect.
It is important to note that we measure peer effects in a situation where the co-agent’s effort remains unchanged. This
design feature avoids the reﬂection problem. When choosing the revised effort, agent i knows that either his decision has
no effect (r = 0) or the effort of the co-agent remains unchanged (r = 1). The random selection of either the initial effort or
the revised effort ensures that the co-agent’s effort is exogenous and has the added advantage that it allows us to collect
revision decisions from all agents.
We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that subjects might want to change their effort decision in the revision stage
for reasons unrelated to peer effects, such as ‘experimenter demand effect’ (e.g., Zizzo, 2010), ‘virtual learning’ (Weber,
2003), or change of mind or even non-stable social preferences (Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2012). Thus, in order to isolate peer
effects from other sources of effort revisions we need a control treatment in addition to the ‘Effort Information treatment’
(EIT). Our control treatment, called the ‘No Information treatment’ (NIT), is identical to the game explained above except
when reaching the revision stage subjects are not informed about the effort choice of the co-agent.
3.2. Further design features and procedural details
In some of the sessions we elicit beliefs about the co-agent’s initial effort choice. This allows us to observe two points of
an agent’s reaction function (Section 6). Subjects enter their belief in the same screen as they choose their initial effort.
Subjects earn additional 100 ECU for a correct belief, nothing otherwise. Because eliciting beliefs might inﬂuence effort
(e.g., Gächter & Renner, 2010) we include the belief elicitation only in some of the sessions.
To check for the robustness of our results we change several contextual parameters across sessions. First, we vary the
level of the agents’ productivity (v = 18 or v = 35 for both agents) and therefore the gains from cooperation. Second, most
of our participants (14 sessions, 357 participants) played a one-shot, three-person gift-exchange game prior to the experi-
ment we report in this paper. In this Experiment 1 agents made their effort decision in the strategy method. Subjects did
not receive any information about other subjects’ decisions prior to the experiment presented in this paper. Another group
of subjects (3 sessions, 108 participants) played Experiment 1’, consisting of eight rounds of a three-person gift-exchange
game with random matching (in matching groups of 12 subjects). These subjects have more experience with the game prior
to the start of the experiment at hand. During the eight rounds agents received information about their principal’s wage
offerings but agents did not receive any direct information about their co-agent’s effort choices. We label these subjects
as Experienced and use this contextual variation to check whether increased experience with the game inﬂuences peer
effects. See Gächter and Thöni (2010) for the results of Experiment 1 and 10. We use the data from Experiment 1 and 10
to classify our subjects into Selﬁsh and Non-selﬁsh types. This provides us with a measure for other-regarding preferences
that is not derived from the decisions in the experiments reported here.
We conducted the experiment at the Universities of St. Gallen and Zurich in computerized laboratories where subjects
were separated by partitions and thus made their decisions in isolation and without communication. All decisions were
anonymous. We used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to run our experiments and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for recruit-
ing the subjects. We framed the experiment in a ‘buyer–seller’ terminology because we deem it to be more neutral than a
labor relations frame.
Our research question requires a one-shot experiment. We therefore took great care to ensure that subjects understand
the rules, as well as the pecuniary payoff consequences of their decisions. Subjects had to answer a set of control questionsrule out overall losses all players were endowed with 400 ECU (experimental currency unit).
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the software provided a ‘What-if calculator’ (see Fig. B1 in Appendix B for an illustration of a decision screen).
We have observations from 18 sessions with a total of 489 participants, 326 agents and 163 principals. The majority (330)
decided in the EIT. The remaining 159 subjects decided in the NIT. We imposed no time limit for decisions. The experiment
lasted about 30 min and the average earnings were CHF 13.8 (€ 8.8). See Table C1 (Appendix C) for further details.
4. Results I: Existence and direction of peer effects
4.1. Initial effort choices
Recall that the EIT and the NIT are identical up to the revision stage. For analyzing initial effort choices we therefore pool
the data. As expected from numerous gift-exchange experiments (surveyed in, e.g., Charness & Kuhn, 2011), efforts increase
in wages.4 Regression analyses conﬁrm this observation (see Appendix D). These analyses also show that subjects who we clas-
sify as Selﬁsh (always chose minimal effort; 28.1%) and Non-selﬁsh (chose at least one non-minimal effort; 71.9%) based on their
behavior in Experiment 1 and 1’ make different initial effort choices in this experiment. Later we use this classiﬁcation to look at
the subgroup of subjects who were sufﬁciently reciprocal toward the principal to choose non-minimal efforts. With regard to
initial effort we ﬁnd that non-selﬁsh subjects are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose a non-minimal initial effort; they also
choose higher initial effort levels than subjects classiﬁed as Selﬁsh.
4.2. Existence of peer effects in voluntary cooperation
The left panel of Fig. 1 shows the frequency of effort revisions in the two treatments. In EIT agents revise their effort in 73
out of 220 of the cases (33.2%). Effort revisions also occur in the NIT: 24 out of 106 agents (22.6%) revise their effort. The
differences between EIT than in NIT are signiﬁcant at p = .050.5
Peer effects presumablymattermost amongagentswho care about others’well-being at all. Agentswithno other-regarding
preferences will always choose minimum effort. Among the Non-selﬁsh subjects 62 out of 141 (44.0%) revise effort in the EIT
while 21 out of 82 (25.6%) do so in the NIT (p = .012).6 Even more frequent are revisions among the subjects who chose a non-
minimal initial effort. Sixty-eight percent of agents in EIT revise their effort. In NIT the corresponding number is 45% (p = .009).
Because observations within a triad are not independent, we treat a triad as an independent cluster of observation.
Table 1 reports the results of Probit estimations (coefﬁcients, standard errors, and marginal effects). The dependent variable
is Revision, a dummy for the decision to revise the effort, which equals one if Dei– 0 and zero otherwise.
Model 1 shows that the EIT increases the probability of an effort revision signiﬁcantly. The marginal effect is a 14.2 per-
centage point increase of the probability in the EIT compared to the NIT. We introduce the initial effort by two variables in
order to allow for changes in the behavior of agents with minimal and non-minimal effort. Initial effort is the effort chosen (ei)
and Minimal initial effort is a dummy for ei = 1. Higher initial efforts increase the probability of an effort revision, whereas
having chosen a minimal initial effort decreases the likelihood to revise (by 41.8 percentage points). None of the other
parameters matters signiﬁcantly.
In Model 2 we repeat the estimation for the restricted sample of agents classiﬁed as non-selﬁsh. The marginal effect of
effort information on revision increases to 21.5%. None of the other contextual variables has a signiﬁcant effect on the proba-
bility of effort revisions.
The magnitude of effort revisions (|Dei|, right panel of Fig. 1) is considerably larger in EIT (.97 on average) than in NIT
(.37). This effect is not only driven by the fact that agents revise effort more frequently when information about their co-
agent’s effort is provided. In the subsample of agents who actually do revise effort (Dei– 0) the difference between the aver-
age absolute effort revisions increases to 1.31 effort units. If we repeat the estimates of Table 1 but apply a Tobit regression
with the absolute effort revision as dependent variable we get very similar results. We summarize these ﬁndings as follows:
Result 1: We ﬁnd evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: Information about the other agent’s effort causes signiﬁ-
cantly more and substantially larger effort revisions compared to the No Information treatment.4.3. Direction of peer effects
We ﬁrst investigate whether effort information has a systematic effect on revised efforts. We apply a Tobit estimate for
the revised effort, dependent on the observed other agent’s effort and controlling for own effort. Table 2 reports the results of
these estimates (EIT only).4 The average effort chosen at the lowest wage is 1.53; the intermediate wage triggered an average effort of 2.97 and the highest wage an average effort of
5.53. Minimal efforts occurred in 68.4%, 49.0% and 37.5% of the cases in which principals paid the low, intermediate and high wage, respectively. Among the 163
principals in our sample 46.6% paid the lowest possible wage of 50. Another 31.3% paid the intermediate wage of 100 and the remaining 22.1% offered the
highest wage of 200.
5 p-values are from v2 tests with correction for dependence within matching group (Rao & Scott, 1984).
6 Among the subjects classiﬁed as Selﬁsh 11% of the subjects revise their effort, while 37% of the Non-selﬁsh subjects revise their effort (p < .000).
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Fig. 1. Frequency (left panel) and magnitude of absolute effort revisions (right panel) in NIT and EIT, with clustered standard errors.
Table 1
Probit estimations for the decision to revise effort.
Dependent variable: Revise (dummy for De^i–0)
Model 1 (all agents) Model 2 (non-selﬁsh agents only)
Coef SE ME Coef SE ME
EIT (D) 0.522*** 0.193 0.142 0.658*** 0.224 0.215
Initial effort 0.136*** 0.039 0.040 0.133*** 0.043 0.046
Minimal initial effort (D) 1.398*** 0.257 0.418 1.441*** 0.314 0.446
Experienced (D) 0.297 0.211 0.082 0.194 0.256 0.065
Belief (D) 0.242 0.216 0.071 0.080 0.257 0.028
High productivity (D) 0.236 0.374 0.064 0.007 0.441 0.003
Zurich (D) 0.048 0.329 0.014 0.227 0.369 0.076
Constant 1.041*** 0.362 0.957** 0.436
N 326 223
Log-likelihood 124.786 94.851
p > v2 0.000 0.000
Notes: The NIT is the omitted benchmark. Apart from Initial effort all independent variables are dummies (D). We report coefﬁcients, standard errors (SE),
and marginal effects (ME). Model 1 uses all agents, and Model 2 only agents classiﬁed as Non-selﬁsh. We apply a robust estimation of the SE clustered within
a matching group.
⁄ p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 2
Tobit estimations for revised effort.
Dependent variable: Revised effort (êi)
Model 1 (all agents) Model 2 (non-selﬁsh agents only)
Coef SE Coef SE
Co-agent’s initial effort (ej) 0.292*** 0.081 0.411*** 0.115
Initial effort 0.489*** 0.092 0.373*** 0.109
Minimal initial effort (D) 4.542*** 0.737 3.634*** 0.605
Experienced (D) 0.146 0.882 1.020 0.809
Belief (D) 0.377 0.922 0.838 0.847
High productivity (D) 1.230 1.379 1.707 1.134
Zurich (D) 1.323 1.149 1.065 0.930
Constant 0.236 0.909 0.923 0.848
R 2.910 2.221
N 220 141
Log-likelihood 248.8 180.3
p > F 0.000 0.000
Notes: Except for the Co-agent’s initial effort and the Initial effort all independent variables are dummies (D). Data from EIT only. Model 1 uses all agents;
Model 2 uses only agents classiﬁed as Non-selﬁsh. Robust standard errors clustered within a triad.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Fig. 2. Scatter plot of effort revisions dependent on the difference between the agents’ initial efforts. The thin lines show the limit cases of no effort revisions
(horizontal line) and ‘perfect’ effort revisions (45-degree line). The bold line depicts a trend line. The total number of observations is 220. Numbers next to
lines indicate number of cases on the respective line, and numbers between lines indicate number of cases between lines.
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agent’s efforts ceteris paribus increase the agent’s effort and vice versa. In Model 2 we restrict our sample to the Non-selﬁsh
types. The estimate for the subgroup is qualitatively similar to the estimate with the whole sample.
The strong and positive inﬂuence of the observed co-agent’s effort on the revised effort suggests that, on average, efforts
are complements. In a next step we take a closer look at how the observed difference between j’s effort and i’s effort inﬂu-
ences i’s revision decision.
Fig. 2 provides a scatter plot of the differences in initial efforts ei and ej and the effort revision in EIT. The size of dots is
proportional to the number of underlying observations. Observations on the thin horizontal line stem from agents who left
their effort unchanged. The second thin line is the 45-degree line. Observations on this line mean that an agent matched the
co-agent’s effort exactly. The numbers in the scatter plot indicate the number of observations within a region. Numbers at
the end of the thin lines count the observations on the line for negative or positive effort differences, respectively. Numbers
in areas between lines count observations within the regions between the thin lines.
For negative initial effort differentials (ej < ei), 20 effort revisions are on the diagonal, and 19 are on the zero-revision line.
Eighteen observations are between the zero-revision line and the diagonal. These agents revise their effort toward the other
agent’s effort but do not match it. The number in the middle of the graph (79) indicates the number of observations with no
initial effort difference and no effort revision. Ninety percent of these observations are from agents choosing minimal initial
effort. In case of positive effort differentials (ej > ei) agents either match the other agent’s effort (in 8 cases), adjust toward the
other agent’s effort but not fully (in 5 cases), or, in most cases (49), do not revise their effort.
The observations in Fig. 2 suggest asymmetric reactions to positive and negative effort differentials. When ﬁtting the data
with a regression line we therefore allow for different slopes and different intercepts. This trend line (the bold line in Fig. 2)
shows a kink at ej – ei = 0, which suggests that on average people only react to their co-agent’s effort if the co-agent chooses a
lower effort than them.
Table 3 shows regressions of effort revision on the initial effort differential (ej – ei), the initial effort ei, and the contextual
parameters. Model 1 disregards any kink in the revision response. The effort differential has a positive and highly signiﬁcant
impact on effort revisions. An increase of the effort differential by one unit induces an agent to increase his effort in the revi-
sion stage by .18 units, ceteris paribus.
However, as Fig. 2 suggests, there are substantial differences between positive and negative effort differentials. In Model 2
we allow for different slopes by adding two additional variables for the initial effort differential. The variable Initial effort
difference if > 0 is calculated as max[ej - ei, 0].
The results of Model 2 conﬁrm the impression from Fig. 2. The coefﬁcient of Initial effort difference is signiﬁcant and posi-
tive. Agents who learn that their co-agent had chosen a lower effort reduce their effort on average by .38 effort units per unit
of the differential. The interaction variable Initial effort difference if > 0 has a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient, indicating that
the reaction to the effort differential is lower in the positive domain. The net effect in the domain of positive effort dif-
ferentials is the sum of the ﬁrst and second coefﬁcient. The effect is positive (.04, the sum of the ﬁrst two coefﬁcients)
Table 3
Effort revisions as a function of effort differences.
Dependent variable: Dei
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Initial effort difference 0.177*** 0.046 0.379*** 0.115 0.372*** 0.118
Initial effort difference if > 0 0.337** 0.134 0.329** 0.138
Initial effort difference > 0 (D) 0.181 0.196 0.212 0.278
Experienced  Initial effort difference 0.184 0.294
Experienced  Initial effort diff. if > 0 0.340 0.277
Experienced  Initial effort diff. > 0 (D) 0.036 0.342
Initial effort 0.319*** 0.074 0.222*** 0.044 0.228*** 0.045
Minimal initial effort (D) 0.550 0.349 0.542* 0.319 0.584* 0.343
Experienced (D) 0.104 0.327 0.106 0.302 0.021 0.289
Belief (D) 0.045 0.407 0.065 0.396 0.068 0.399
High productivity (D) 0.876 0.661 0.634 0.548 0.646 0.556
Zurich (D) 0.951 0.598 0.611 0.461 0.617 0.469
Constant 0.768 0.522 0.852* 0.482 0.879* 0.498
N 220 220 220
Log-likelihood 418.1 411.6 411.3
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
r2 0.419 0.453 0.454
Notes: OLS regression of the effort revisionDei dependent on the difference in the initial efforts (Effort difference ej - ei). Model 2 allows for different slopes in
the positive and negative domain by including the effort difference in the positive range, i.e., max[ej  ei,0] and a dummy for positive effort differences. In
Model 3 we add interaction variables between Experienced and the measures for effort differences. Robust standard errors in parentheses, two agents in a
group are clustered.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
C. Thöni, S. Gächter / Journal of Economic Psychology 48 (2015) 72–88 79but not signiﬁcantly different from zero (p = .436, F-test). Thus, the interaction between the two efforts is mainly driven by
effort reductions of the high-effort agents.
Among the remaining variables only Initial effort has a signiﬁcant impact on the effort revision; the coefﬁcient is negative.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the higher the initial effort the larger is the downward revision.
Model 3 allows for the possibility that agents who are experienced with the gift-exchange game react differently to effort
information than inexperienced agents. The interaction variables are insigniﬁcant. Thus, the observed peer effects are robust
to experience.
We summarize our ﬁndings in Result 2.
Result 2: Overall, effort revisions and differences in initial efforts are positively correlated. Agents who learn that their co-agent
has provided less effort than them reduce their effort signiﬁcantly, whereas we do not ﬁnd systematic effects for agents who
chose a lower initial effort than their co-agent.4.4. Peer effects or learning?
The fact that people tend to revise their efforts downwards when facing an agent with a lower effort can be explained by
peer effects, but might as well be an indication of the importance of learning. For two reasons we think that our results can-
not be explained by learning effects. First, Model 3 of Table 3 shows that experienced subjects do not exhibit weaker reac-
tions to effort information. Second, recall that subjects had access to a ‘What-if Calculator’. Our software recorded subjects’
calculations. All but 11 of our 489 subjects calculated the payoffs for the Nash equilibrium efforts and therefore should not
have been surprised by the fact that a co-agent with a lower effort earns a higher payoff. Thus, Results 1 and 2 are most likely
not due to learning about the money maximizing strategy.
5. What standard models of social preferences predict about peer effects in the trilateral gift-exchange game
In this section we explore what existing theories of social preferences have to say on explaining peer effects, given that all
theories we look at in this section can explain initial effort choices. We focus our analysis on the subgame starting when the
two agents choose their effort. We derive agent i’s reaction function to agent j’s effort decision, that is, ei = R(ej) and focus on
the derivative with respect to ej. A particular model predicts a peer effect if dei/de– 0; no peer effect is predicted if dei/de = 0.
Because (i) role allocation was random (ii) we explained the game to the subjects as a three-player game and made them
aware of the earnings consequences of each other’s choices (see instructions and Fig. B1), and (iii) subjects were not informed
about any decision other three-player groups took, we assume that a group of three players forms the reference group.
In the following we derive the basic results and brieﬂy discuss the underlying intuitions. For all details see Appendix E.
Readers not interested in the details can directly refer to the summary Table 4 at the end of this section.
Table 4
Summary of theoretical predictions with regard to dei/dej.
Class Model Slope of R(ej) for interior solutions (1 < ei < 20) Numerical range
(v = 35)
Money maximizing 0 (no interior solutions)
Distributional
preferences
Altruism Cox et al. (2007) (.63, .98)
Charness and Rabin (2002)
– Maximin .83 [ 1.2
– Intermediate .83 [ 1
– Utilitarian 0 (no interior solutions)
Inequity
aversion
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) (.57, .70)
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
– Aheadness averse (AA) .83
– Behindness averse (BA) .83 [ 1
(Type based) reciprocity Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004)
0
Levine (1998) 0
Hybrid models Cox et al. (2007) No additional slopes to altruism prediction
Charness and Rabin (2002) No additional slopes to altruism prediction
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) .83
Notes: Predictions for the slope of agent i’s reaction function to agent j’s effort, ei = R(ej). For the piecewise linear models (Charness & Rabin; Fehr & Schmidt)
we can calculate the slopes directly from the formula for v = 35. For models predicting a continuum of reaction functions we derive the range of possible
slopes. For Cox et al. (2007) we report the range of slopes of best replies that lead to interior solutions. In case of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) there is no
closed-form solution for the best replies. The numbers reported are from numerical calculations using parameterized utility function u = xi – b(ri – 1/n)2.
Details are in Online Appendix E.
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We consider models of altruism and inequity aversion. Players have a utility function ui(xi, xj, xP) deﬁned on the monetary
earnings xi, xj and xP of the two agents i and j and the principal P, respectively (see Eqs. (1) and (2) in Section 3.1). The models
differ in the assumptions about the derivatives of ui with respect to other players’ earnings. Models of altruism like Charness
and Rabin (2002) or Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) assume that these derivatives are positive. Models of inequity aver-
sion (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) assume that these derivatives are positive as long as other players are
poorer than player i but negative otherwise. We now discuss these models in turn.
5.2. Models of altruism
Assume agent i maximizes a utility function ui(xi, xj, xP). The other agent’s payoff xj is independent of i’s actions. Agent i
chooses ei to set xi and xP at the level which maximizes her utility given xj. The left panel in Fig. 3 illustrates the utility maxi-
mization problem of agent i in the (xi, xP) space. The lower thick line represents the choice set for agent i in the example case
where agent j chooses ej = 4 If agent i chooses maximum effort the principal’s earnings are highest and i’s earnings are low-
est. The slope of the graph representing the choice set is v/7, the marginal beneﬁt of effort divided by the marginal cost of
effort. The thin lines show two indifference curves of agent i. The slope of the indifference curves indicates the marginal rate
of substitution between agent i’s earnings and the principal’s earnings. If agent i cares sufﬁciently for the earnings of the
principal (as reﬂected in agent i’s indifference curves) then the optimal effort choice ei⁄ is non-minimal, as depicted in
the left panel of Fig. 3.
How does an altruistic agent react to changes in ej? An increase in the other agent’s effort, for instance, shifts the choice
set in Fig. 3 upwards because it increases the principal’s income. The location of the new optimum depends on the ‘income
elasticity’ of the demand for xi, the own income. If the own income is a ‘normal good’, the new optimum lies northeast of the
old optimum as depicted in the left panel of Fig. 3. In this case agent i reduces her effort whenever agent j increases his effort.
In the following we focus on agent i’s reaction function to j’s effort. The right panel of Fig. 3 depicts the corresponding reac-
tion function. If xi is a normal good for agent i, then the slope of the reaction function is negative for interior solutions, that is,
the two efforts are strategic substitutes (dei/dej < 0).7
For expositional purposes we derive the reaction functions using a parameterized version proposed by Cox et al. (2007).8
They use a CES utility function7 Ass
than th
observe
8 The
approacuming that xi is a normal good is reasonable for most people and situations. Otherwise, a subject facing a windfall gain should be ready to transfer more
e gain to another subject. In a trust game, for instance, a subject should return more money than received by the trustor, a behavior which is hardly ever
d.
model builds on Cox and Sadiraj (2012) who introduced (in the working paper version of 2003) the CES function as shown in Eq. (3) and call their
h a model of egocentric altruism.
xi (w,ei)
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Fig. 3. Peer effects in a model of altruism. Left panel: Utility maximization in the (xp, xi) space for an altruistic agent i. Thick lines represent two choice sets
for two levels of the other agent’s effort; u1 and u2 indicate indifference curves of an altruistic agent i; ei⁄ denotes the optimal effort of agent i in case agent j
chooses an effort of 5 and the lower thick line is i’s choice set. Right panel: Corresponding reaction function of agent i to agent j’s effort.
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which allows varying the elasticity of substitution between an agent’s own payoff and the other players’ payoffs by
a e (1, 0) [ (0, 1]; hj and hP measure the emotional state of player i toward the other two players. Suppose for a moment
that hj and hP are positive. For a = 1 the payoffs are perfect substitutes and agent i chooses either maximal effort (for hP > 7/v)
or minimal effort (otherwise), irrespective of ej. In this case the slope of the reaction function is zero and there is no interior
solution. Panel A of Fig. 4 shows these reaction functions as horizontal lines at the bottom and the top of i’s action space.
Another extreme case is when the payoffs are perfect complements and weighted equally (Leontief case a ? 1 and
hP = 1). In this case agent i chooses ei to ensure xi = xP (if feasible). The reaction function can be derived by solving this equa-
tion for ei which gives us a linear function with a slope of v/(v + 7).
Between these extremes is a continuum of negatively-sloped reaction functions. The lines in Fig. 4A show some examples.
All reaction functions are linear functions that intersect at a point far to the upper left of the admissible effort space. Both the
slope and the intercept of the reaction function are jointly determined by a and hP. Optimal efforts of agent i might lead to
situations where the principal earns more than agent i, which is the case above the thick line in Fig. 4A. In all cases the slope
lies in (1, 0) for interior solutions.
Another model of altruism is Charness and Rabin (2002) who – in the basic version – propose a utility function that cap-
tures preferences for efﬁciency (utilitarian) and/or care for the least fortunate (maximin). Utility is case-wise linear in all
arguments:uðxi; xj; xPÞ ¼ ð1 kÞxi þ k½dminfxi; xj; xPg þ ð1 dÞðxi þ xj þ xPÞ; ð4Þ
with k weighing the importance of distributional preferences (k 2 ½0; 1) and d measuring the type of distributional prefer-
ences, ranging from d = 0 for pure efﬁciency concerns to d = 1 for pure maximin concerns. Unlike the Cox et al. (2007) model,
Charness and Rabin do not predict a continuum but only four distinct kinds of reaction functions: For a low enough k an
agent always chooses minimal effort. For high k and low d an agent seeks to maximize joint income and chooses maximum
effort (thereby minimizing her own income). This reaction function is labeled as ‘Utilitarian’ in Fig. 4B. The most interesting
cases are the intermediate ones in between the utilitarian and maximin cases. If the maximin motive dominates (high d),
agent i increases her effort if and only if she can increase the minimal earnings in the group.
In Fig. 4A we already introduced the locus where agent i earns the same as the principal (xi = xP) as a downward-sloping
linear function. In panel B we add two loci: a steeper downward-sloping function indicating where agent j earns the same as
the principal (xj = xP) and the 45-degree line indicating where the two agents earn the same. The intersection of the three
lines is the situation in which all three earnings are equal, which is the case when both agents choose e ¼ ð3wþ 7Þ=ð2v þ 7Þ.
In case of ej < e a maximin agent chooses her effort along xi = xp, to prevent the principal from being the uniquely poorest.
In case of ej > e agent i is always richer than agent j. Agent i cannot inﬂuence xj; however, i’s choice determines whether
agent j or the principal is poorest. Agent i then chooses her effort such that the principal does not earn less than agent j, that
is, the reaction function follows xj = xp. Finally, for intermediate values of d there is a type with a v-shaped best reply. She
promotes efﬁciency under the restriction that her own earnings do not become the unique minimum. For ej < e this agent
acts as a maximin type; for ej > e she matches agent j’s effort and, hence, the reaction function follows the 45-degree line.
5.3. Models of inequity aversion
Theories of inequity aversion assume that agents dislike unequal payoff distributions, ceteris paribus. Consider the model
of inequity aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Utility is u(xi, ri) where ri is i’s share of total earnings. For a given xi
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Fig. 4. Illustrations of peer effects (Reaction functions ei = R(ej)) predicted by theories of distributional preferences. Note: The reaction functions are drawn
for w = 200 and v = 35.
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consider ﬁrst the case of a very strongly inequity averse player, who only cares about her payoff share. In the role of agent i, this
player chooses her effort such that her share of total earnings equals one third:9 An
in our gxiðw; eiÞ
xiðw; eiÞ þ xjðw; ejÞ þ xPðw; ei; ejÞ ¼
1
3
: ð5ÞFor such a player the two efforts are strategic substitutes. To see this, consider an increase of player j’s effort. This
decreases xj and increases xP. Since providing more effort is efﬁcient the sum of xj and xP increases by v – 7 > 0 and the
left-hand expression in (5) drops below 1/3. To re-establish equality agent i must decrease her effort in order to increase
xi. The reaction function of such an agent is depicted in Fig. 4C, labeled as ‘Exclusively equity-oriented’. Using the payoff func-
tions (1) and (2) and solving (5) for ei one can show that the slope of the reaction function is (7  v)/(14 + v) < 0 (note that
this is not the same reaction function as the limit case in panel A where xi = xp). Players with weaker inequity aversion face a
tradeoff between the beneﬁt of their own payoff and the discomfort of earning a relative income above one third. Lower con-
cerns for inequity aversion lead to lower efforts, ceteris paribus.
The thin lines in Fig. 4C show ﬁve examples of reaction functions. There is a lower limit of inequity aversion under which
behavior is identical to money-maximization. However, it generally holds that, for interior solutions (1 < ei < 20), the slope of
the reaction function is always in (1, 0), that is, the two efforts are always strategic substitutes.
The intuition is that an inequity-averse agent providing low effort suffers from earning more than the equal share. To
relieve this adverse feeling there are two possibilities: (i) she increases her own effort and thereby lowers her earnings,early strand of literature incorporated envy into the utility function (Bolton, 1991; Kirchsteiger, 1994). These models cannot explain non-minimal efforts
ame, because players seek to maximize their absolute and relative monetary payoff.
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the agent at hand closer to the equal share.
The model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is also built on the notion of inequity aversion. However, unlike in the model by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) players make bilateral comparisons with all group members. Players get utility from their own
monetary payoff and disutility from any payoff difference with comparison partners (see also Loewenstein, Thompson, and
Bazerman (1989)). The utility function in the Fehr–Schmidt model isuðxÞ ¼ xi  a2 ½xj  xi
þ þ ½xP  xiþ
  b
2
½xi  xjþ þ ½xi  xPþ
 
; ð6Þwhere [a]+ max(a,0). The disutility of earning less than another group member is linear and equal to a times the payoff
difference. Earning more than another group member also leads to a disutility, weighted by b (but b < a). We illustrate
the reaction functions of Fehr–Schmidt agents in Fig. 4D. Two loci are important: the negatively-sloped line where agent
i earns the same as the principal and the 45-degree line where the two agents earn the same. In the intersection of the
two lines all three players earn the same, which is the case at e ¼ e.
The Fehr–Schmidt model predicts three types: A player with low concern for advantageous inequality (b < b’ = 14/
(v + 14)  0.29 for v = 35) always choose minimal effort. For higher b there are two possibilities depending on the relative
importance of a and b: If a player is relatively intolerant toward disadvantageous inequality compared to his intolerance
of advantageous inequality, we call her ‘Behindness averse’ (BA; b’ < b < (14 + 7a)/(v + 7)). Such an agent chooses non-mini-
mal efforts under the condition that she does not fall behind another player. For low co-agent’s efforts ðej < eÞ the best reply
is ei = ej up to e. For high co-agent’s efforts ðej P eÞ she chooses the effort that equalizes his earnings to the principal’s earn-
ings. A third type called ‘Aheadness averse’ (AA; b’ < b > (14 + 7a)/(v + 7)) is an agent i who (i) suffers heavily from the fact
that the principal earns less than her (high b), and (ii) is relatively tolerant to the fact that she earns less than agent j
(low a). Such an agent always seeks to match her payoff with the principal’s payoff. The resulting reaction function is iden-
tical to the Leontief case shown in panel A of Fig. 4.
5.4. Models of reciprocity
Theories of reciprocity model the idea that people reward kind acts with kindness and mean acts with unkindness (Rabin,
1993). A theory of reciprocity that is adequate for our sequential gift-exchange game is the sequential reciprocity model by
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). This theory does not predict peer effects because agent j’s effort has no inﬂuence on
agent i’s earnings. Thus agent j is neither kind nor unkind to agent i. Hence, dei/dej = 0. The only reason for choosing a
non-minimal effort is to reward the principal for a high wage, irrespective of the other agent’s actions.
In case of type-based reciprocity (Levine, 1998) the results are similar. In this model players gain (dis)utility from other
agents’ income if they are altruistic (spiteful) types. However, since the agents cannot inﬂuence their co-agent’s income they
cannot act altruistically (or spitefully) toward them and thus, do not take their actions into account. Hence, no peer effects
are predicted: dei/dej = 0.
5.5. Hybrid models
Cox et al. (2007) and Charness and Rabin (2002) enrich their models of altruism with reciprocity. In both cases reciprocity
does, however, not change the qualitative predictions about the shape of the reaction functions discussed so far. Reciprocity
means that if the agent is treated unkindly she weighs the earnings of the unkind player less or even negatively in her utility
function. In both models intentions play a role only with respect to the wage offer. Low wage offers are perceived as unkind,
high wages as kind. In case of Cox et al. (2007) a low wage leads to a negative hP. A player with hP < 0 chooses minimal effort
irrespective of ej, thus acting like a money-maximizing agent. Also in Charness and Rabin (2002) there is a reciprocity part by
which payoff-based concerns are reduced when a player is treated unkindly by another player. Negative emotions toward
the principal shift the reaction functions downwards but do not qualitatively change the characteristics derived above.
Finally, the model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) combines interpersonal payoff comparisons with intentionality. Like in
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), reciprocity does not predict a direct link between the two efforts. However, agent i
wants to reciprocate to the principal and cares about earnings differences. The predictions of the Falk-Fischbacher model
are very similar to the predictions of the AA-type in the Fehr–Schmidt model. For very strong reciprocal preferences the reac-
tion function is again identical to the AA-type, weaker reciprocal preferences result in a parallel downward shift.
5.6. Summary
Table 4 summarizes the models and their predicted peer effects (the predicted slope of the reaction function(s)). The
rightmost column of Table 4 provides numerical boundaries for the slope of the reaction function(s) of the respective model.
With two exceptions all models of social preferences predict either that efforts are unrelated (no peer effects) or that peer
effects take the form of efforts being strategic substitutes. The intuition for the latter is simple: with distributional prefer-
ences agents will choose non-minimal efforts either because they (i) enjoy the principal’s earnings (altruism), or (ii) they
seek equitable outcomes (inequity aversion). A co-agent who puts in high effort reduces i’s need to put in high effort. In none
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actions. There are two notable exceptions that allow for strategic complementarity between the two efforts, the Fehr–
Schmidt BA-type, and the Charness–Rabin intermediate type. In both cases efforts have to be one-to-one complements, that
is, the two agents choose identical efforts.
Our analysis shows that the most robust prediction about peer effects is that the agents’ efforts are strategic substitutes.
By contrast, Fig. 2 suggests that efforts are strategic complements. This observation of positively correlated efforts is not yet
conclusive, however, because the predictions concern the slope of the reaction function. In the following we report experi-
ments that provide qualitative conclusions about the sign of peer effects.
6. Results II: Can standard models of social preferences explain peer effects?
In order to measure the slope of the reaction function we make use of agent i’s belief about agent j’s initial effort. In a
subset of our data (n = 110) we elicited agents’ beliefs about their co-agent’s initial effort decision. Given the belief we
can observe two points on an agent’s reaction function in case the belief was wrong. This provides a direct measure of
the sign of the slope of a monotonic reaction function by estimating the function Dei ¼ f ðej  e0jÞ, where e0j denotes agent
i’s belief about j’s initial effort. We call the difference between the true co-agent’s effort and the belief ‘surprise’.
We use OLS to estimate the average Dei ¼ aþ bðej  e0jÞ þ e. According to the theories discussed above, the difference
between the belief and the actual effort of the co-agent is the only reason to revise effort. Thus, all theories predict a = 0.
The predicted slope of the reaction function depends on the productivity parameter v. However, we do not have to control
for this because all our observations with the belief question stem from experiments with v = 35. As said, a robust prediction
is that efforts are strategic substitutes and the slope of the reaction function is between .98 and .57 (see Table 4).
In contrast, the estimation results show that the slope coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant (b = .261, p = .003). The con-
stant is insigniﬁcant (a = -.230, p = .216). Fig. 5 shows a scatter plot of the relevant data and the OLS regression line. We allow
for different slopes in the negative and positive domain. Again we observe a kink when we go from a negative to a positive
surprise. The shaded area and the diagonal in Fig. 5 show the range of slopes predicted by the various models of social pre-
ferences. Irrespective of whether we estimate the reaction as a whole or piecewise we can rule out a negative slope for the
reaction function.
Apart from the large number of observations in the origin (which are compatible with any slope of the reaction function)
there are very few observations that are compatible with a negatively-sloped reaction function. The Fehr–Schmidt model can
account for a positively-sloped reaction function (see Table 4 and Fig. 4D). A BA-type Fehr–Schmidt agent chooses to match
the other agent’s effort up to a certain threshold. According to the parameter calibration suggested by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) we should observe only 10% BA-type agents in the experiments with the high productivity parameter; the estimates
provided by Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) suggest 21% BA-type agents.-1
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Fig. 5. Effort revisions dependent on the difference between the actual ej and agent i’s belief ej’. The shaded areas and the diagonal are predictions
consistent with theories of social preferences.
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the initial effort is chosen according to the best-reply function given the belief about ej, and (ii) the revised effort is chosen
according to the best-reply function given the observed ej. Of the 220 observations in the EIT, 95 (43%) are compatible with
the BA-prediction. However, a lot of these observations are minimal efforts and therefore also compatible with the standard
prediction. If we restrict our sample to agents with non-minimal initial efforts then only 16 out of 96 (17%) choose their
efforts in accordance with the BA type. Another possibility is to look at the fraction of effort revisions (Dei– 0) that are
explained by the BA-type behavior. Among the 73 agents who do revise their effort only 14 agents (19%) do so according
to the prediction.
The second theory that predicted positively-sloped reaction functions is the intermediate type in Charness and Rabin
(2002). Thirteen (6%) out of the 220 observations in the EIT follow this pattern. Among the 73 agents who do revise their
effort six (8%) do so as predicted by the intermediate type. Furthermore, although the slope estimates are positive, they
are nowhere near unity, as the two theoretical cases would predict. An F-test rejects the hypothesis b = 1 for both the linear
and the piecewise linear estimate (p < .01).
We summarize our ﬁndings in Result 3:
Result 3: Peer effects in voluntary cooperation predominately take the form of efforts being strategic complements rather than
substitutes as predicted by most theories of social preferences.
The explanations offered by standard theories of social preferences do not capture the peer effects we observe. One appar-
ent possibility to account for this is to alter the deﬁnition of the reference group. Suppose that for some reason, agents only
compare among themselves, e.g., because they feel more attached to the co-agent than to the principal. Yet, redeﬁning the
reference group to comprise only the agents in not convincing. To see why, assume an agent with distributional preferences
u(xi, xj). By design, agent i cannot inﬂuence xj, the proﬁt of player j. Therefore, even with altruistic preferences agent i chooses
minimal effort irrespective of ej. A Fehr–Schmidt agent would as well always choose minimal effort, because adjusting to a
higher co-agent’s effort would require b > 1, which is ruled out by the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. The only model that
predicts strategic complementarity in this case is Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In the extreme case of an exclusively equity-
oriented agent the reaction function matches the other agent’s effort. But even in this situation it is unclear why two such
agents should coordinate on non-minimal efforts, because they could increase utility by choosing minimal effort.
7. Discussion: Economic signiﬁcance and explanations for peer effects in voluntary cooperation
Before we investigate potential explanations of peer effects we discuss the economic signiﬁcance of efforts as strategic
complements. Positively correlated efforts due to peer effects allow for the possibility of multiple equilibria, i.e., high and
low effort cultures, depending on the team composition. The ‘kinked effort function’ in Fig. 2 suggests that a low effort sit-
uation is more likely to emerge because people are not willing to increase effort if others have exerted higher efforts but are
ready to reduce effort if others provided less effort. More research is needed, however, to understand the nature of positively
correlated efforts.
Our ﬁndings contrast with the ﬁeld (experimental) results reported by Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009)
who ﬁnd the opposite, namely that mutual observability increases the productivity of the low effort agents. We can only
speculate about the reasons for this result. One explanation is that our experiment is conducted in full anonymity whereas
in these studies agents could observe and talk to each other, which might have exerted some social pressure on low-per-
forming agents. An additional possibility is that our effort choice is an abstract decision, whereas in these studies effort is
linked to a real task. ‘Social facilitation’ (Zajonc, 1965) suggests that the mere presence of another person can improve per-
formance (see also Falk & Ichino, 2006, p. 48, for a related discussion).
We now turn to the theoretical discussion of our empirical results which are opposite to the predictions of a host of stan-
dard theories of social preferences. If standard models of social preferences cannot explain the peer effects we see, the ques-
tion arises whether motivations that are not captured by the standard models can explain our results. One possibility is that
people are conformists - a tendency long established by social psychologists (Asch, 1952). Conformism ‘‘refers to the act of
changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others’’ (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004, p. 606). Conformity is a potential
channel because it is a common and deeply rooted human predisposition (Henrich & Boyd, 1998) that can also explain
important economic phenomena (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1994; Clark & Oswald, 1998) including ones related to our research
question (Sliwka, 2007).
Another possibility is that people follow a norm of reciprocity but take the behavior of others as a cue about what is an
appropriate reciprocal response. Such norm-following is empirically plausible (e.g., Krupka & Weber, 2013; López-Pérez,
2008).
Positively correlated efforts can also result if people are motivated by social esteem (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008)
whereby effort choices are made to create favorable impressions in the other players. In the remainder we sketch three
recent new generation models of social preferences that, respectively, incorporate conformity, norm-following, and social
esteem as relevant social motivations into their frameworks. All three models predict that peer effects take the form of posi-
tively correlated efforts (see online Appendix E).
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have distributional social preferences: uF(xi, xj, xP). Conformism is introduced by assuming a third type, a conformist agent,
whose utility is either uS or uF, depending on which type she thinks is more frequent in the population. All conformist agents
have a prior about the distribution of types in the population. The revision stage in our experiment provides the agents with
additional information about the distribution of types. An agent with non-minimal effort might thus conform to money-
maximizing behavior if she is paired with an agent with minimal effort and vice versa.
Agents might also derive utility for norm-following (or disutility from breaking them). López-Pérez (2008) provides a for-
malization of this possibility. He starts with the simple idea that players share a common norm which guides behavior. The
norm demands from an agent to choose an effort ~e. Utility is given as10 Clo
(ii) mon
the play
efforts.
allowsui ¼
xi if ei ¼ ~e
xi  cr else

ð7Þwhere xi denotes the earnings, c > 0 is a preference parameter and r denotes the number of players who did not (yet) break
the norm. If the agent sticks to the norm then her utility is equal to her earnings. If the agent deviates and chooses ei < ~e then
she enjoys higher earnings but suffers a psychological cost of cr, which can be interpreted as a feeling of guilt or shame.
These costs do not depend on the size of the deviation, which implies that whenever an agent deviates she chooses ei = 1.
Furthermore, breaking a norm is assumed to be less costly to the agent if others do so as well, that is, if r is low.
López-Pérez posits an efﬁciency and equity normwhere a social welfare function is maximized which contains (i) the sum
of all earnings and (ii) the difference between the best-off and worst-off player. For the three-person gift-exchange game the
norm demands the principal to pay the highest wage and the two agents to choose either maximum effort ð~e ¼ 20Þ or the
effort which equalizes all earnings at the highest wage ð~e ¼ ejw¼200 ¼ 607=ð2v þ 7ÞÞ, depending on the relative weight of
argument (i) and (ii).
An agent’s effort depends on the strength of her preference parameter (c) and on whether she observes the co-agent vio-
lating the norm. If c is large (small), the agent always (never) follows the norm. There is an interesting intermediate range of
cwhere an agent starts by obeying the norm and thus chooses non-minimal effort, but revises to minimal effort if she learns
that the co-agent did not follow the norm.
Considerations of social esteem can also explain positively correlated efforts. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) model
players who care about what others think of them.10 Their model is only deﬁned for two players. We assume a utility function
adapted for our three-player gift-exchange game:ui ¼ xi þ hiðxj þ xPÞ þ hijrj þ hiPrP : ð8Þ
The ﬁrst two terms concern the material outcomes of the game for which the model assumes altruistic preferences
(hiP 0, similar to the model of Cox et al. (2007) for a = 1) and hij measures agent j’s estimation about hi, interpreted as j’s
esteem for i. Finally rj measures how important j’s opinion is for i, and it is assumed that rj is increasing in hj, i.e., the higher
the altruism of the other player the more his opinion matters to agent i. Taken together, the third term in (8) represents
agent i’s pride from the interaction with the other agent and the fourth term is i’s pride from the interaction with the
principal.
The model turns the gift-exchange game into a signaling game. Ellingsen and Johannesson assume that there are two
types of agents, altruists with hH and selﬁsh players with hL (hH > hL). They show that in a separating equilibrium selﬁsh
agents choose minimal effort while altruistic agents signal their type to the principal by choosing a non-minimal effort ~ei.
In the three-player gift-exchange game agents not only signal their type to the principal but also to the other agent.
When choosing the initial effort agents do not know the type of the other agent but have a prior probability p of expecting
an altruistic type. In online Appendix E9 we show that the effort necessary to signal altruistic preferences is increasing in p,
that is, there is a function ~eiðpÞwith ~e0i > 0. Intuitively, the more likely it is that i’s co-agent is altruistic the more pride agent i
can gain by being regarded as an altruist, irrespective of whether she actually is an altruist or not. Thus, to credibly demon-
strate her altruism, i must become more generous to the principal. In our three-player gift-exchange game selﬁsh players
always choose minimal effort. Altruistic agents initially choose ei ¼ ~eiðpÞ > 1. In the revision stage agents learn the type
of their co-agent and update their prior probability to either 0 or 1. When paired with a selﬁsh player they lower their effort
to e^i ¼ ~eið0Þ, else they increase their effort to e^i ¼ ~eið1Þ. Thus, concerns for social esteem can explain positively correlated
efforts, but cannot explain the kink in effort revisions observed in the experiment.
In summary, newer theories of social preferences that expand social motives beyond distributional concerns and inten-
tions by incorporating desires for conformity, norm-following, or social esteem, can rationalize the empirically observed
positively correlated efforts. The kink in the reaction to observed effort differences shown in Fig. 2 is best captured by the
model of López-Pérez (2008). Of the three models considered here this is the only model that predicts a distinct asymmetric
effect of the effort information in the three-person gift exchange game: some agents initially choose their effort according tosely related is the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2006), which assumes that players differ in two dimensions, their preference for (i) the social good and
ey. Players choose their actions to signal high interest in (i) and low interest in (ii). Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) present a model which formulates
ers’ desire to be perceived as fair and apply it to dictator games. Guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007) can also explain positively correlated
A guilt averse agent may form a belief about what the principal expects and choose effort to conform to this expectation. Observing the co-agent’s effort
updating the belief about what the principal might expect and this may induce the agent to change effort.
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(Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007). If they ﬁnd it optimal to break the norm in the ﬁrst place then observing high co-agent’s
efforts does not turn them into norm-abiding players. This suggests that peer effects as observed in our experiment are bet-
ter explained by models of conformity, norm-guided behavior or considerations of social esteem than more direct motives
such as altruism or inequity aversion.
It is also possible to enrich standard theories by conformity or norm abiding motives. In models of reciprocity the neces-
sary steps seem obvious: the parameter which governs positive or negative reciprocity toward the principal needs to depend
somehow on the information about the co-agent’s action. For example, in Cox et al. (2007) we could reformulate the emo-
tional state hP as being positively related to agent i’s belief about agent j’s emotional state toward the principal, thus intro-
ducing a desire to conform into the model. In the revision stage the agent would then update his information about the
emotional state of the co-agent and we could generate positively sloped reaction functions.
One may object that these newer theories also allow for more social motives than the standard theories of social prefer-
ences, and one standard theory, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model (the BA-type, see Table 4), actually can, at least qual-
itatively, explain positively correlated efforts without resorting to additional motives. Put differently, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) might provide a parsimonious explanation of peer effects in voluntary cooperation, if we are prepared to relax the
prediction that agents choose the same efforts to positively correlated efforts. Whether this is a valid argument is a task
for future research and Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton (2013) provide a ﬁrst step in this direction. They build on the theoreti-
cal results of this paper (that Fehr–Schmidt preferences can, at least qualitatively, explain peer effects) and also provide evi-
dence that the measured descriptive norms are consistent with the peer effects we see as well. Interestingly, a quantitative
comparison between norms and Fehr–Schmidt preferences for peer effects suggests a surprisingly strong explanatory power
of Fehr–Schmidt preferences, despite unambiguous evidence that descriptive norms exhibit peer effects.
8. Summary
We developed a novel experimental gift-exchange game with effort revision to study the role of peer effects in social pre-
ferences. Our design avoids the reﬂection problem and allows studying the reaction of an agent to the information about a
co-agent’s effort in isolation. We ﬁnd that efforts are strategic complements, in particular when the co-agent’s effort is lower
than the agent’s effort. This poses a challenge to the standard theories of social preferences which predict either unrelated
efforts or strategic substitutes. Newer theories of conformity, social norms, and esteem, do a better job in explaining the peer
effects we see.
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